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Martha J. McNamara, From Tavern to Courthouse: Architecture and Ritual in
American Law, 1658-1860, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
Pp. 182. $72 (ISBN 0-8018-7395-9).
From Tavern to Courthouse examines the legal history of early Massachusetts through
the lens of courthouse architecture. It describes an emerging professional legal bar
struggling to elevate its prestige through the construction of increasingly special-
ized and dignified spaces for court proceedings. The strength of the book lies in its
visual images and in the anecdotal descriptions of physical spaces and rituals that
McNamara culled from primary materials. The book contains what is likely to re-
main a definitive collection of photographs and drawings of the courthouses built in
Massachusetts between the mid-seventeenth century and the mid-nineteenth century.
The numerous anecdotes peppered throughout the book---often comments by major
historical figures like Samuel Sewall and John Adams-provide a fascinating glimpse
into how architecture and ritual were experienced by participants in the system.
McNamara uncovers three broad phases in the evolution of the legal system
during the period she studies. The most important discovery of the book is that,
prior to the late eighteenth century, court proceedings took place in "townhouses";
multipurpose buildings located in town centers that contained mixed-use space for
commercial and government activities. In the typical townhouse, merchants and
shopkeepers used the first floor as a market exchange. The second floor contained
multi-purpose rooms that accommodated, at various times, civil, criminal, and
probate courts, town meetings, and public land title and mortgage records. Judi-
cial business in the form of jury deliberations and decision making by individual
justices of the peace often spilled over into local taverns.
As McNamara notes, the townhouse design reveals the close connections be-
tween commercial interests and the legal system in early America. In Boston, part
of a merchant's daily routine was to "walk the exchange" at the townhouse, which
meant to literally walk around the market gathering information about market
developments (such as ships arriving and departing, new regulations, and market
conditions). These merchants were likely to have frequent encounters with the
justices of the peace, clerks, and legislators who performed their duties on the
second floor of the building and, again, who often moved to taverns to deliberate as
members of a jury or to execute deeds and decide cases as justices of the peace.
Although not emphasized by McNamara, the townhouse is terrific evidence that
a central function of the colonial legal system was to generate reputational and
economic information about individuals in the community. Why was the courthouse
placed above the merchants' exchange? One reason is that the design made sense in
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a society, like that of the American colonies, in which most economic transactions
involved relations of indebtedness and extensions of credit were a primary form
of investment for people with resources. News of the daily court judgments, the
recording of mortgages, and judicial decisions related to the probate of wills and
inheritance were the contemporary equivalent of a ticker tape charting the status
of one's investments. The information generated at court was market information
as important as the information gleaned from the merchants' exchange.
In such a society, reputation was possibly a person's most valuable asset and
shame sanctions were an effective form of punishment. Surprisingly, McNamara
does not examine in detail how the architecture of townhouses included prominent
spaces allocated for the administration of shame sanctions. In a conjectural draw-
ing of the 1658 Boston townhouse included in the book (fig. I.I), the whipping
post and pillory are placed prominently in front of and visible from the merchants'
exchange. One law in effect during the mid-seventeenth century (not mentioned by
McNamara), for example, penalized the altering of public mortgage records with
either two months in jailor two hours in the pillory at the merchants' exchange
with a sign "Defacer of Records" over one's head. A discussion of the relationship
between shaming sanctions and architecture would have enriched her account.
McNamara instead emphasizes that, from the perspective of lawyers and oth-
ers involved in the legal system, the architecture of the townhouse suffered from
one principal weakness: its mixed-use spaces did little to elevate their standing
and, therefore, "the weight of communicating judicial authority fell primarily to
the justices and to their court rituals" (II). Without dignified architecture, legal
actors had to emphasize protocol and rituals, such as horn-blowing, costumes,
and processionals to gain legitimacy. Heavy emphasis on protocol and costume,
however, was not always effective. In his description of the famous Writs of As-
sistance case that mobilized support for the American Revolution, John Adams
described the judges as wearing dress "more solemn and more pompous than that
of the Roman Senate when the Gauls broke in upon them" (59).
Between 1765 and 1840, the number of trained lawyers in Massachusetts rose
from fifty to more than six hundred (57). McNamara asserts that lawyers led a
successful movement for the building of courthouses that conferred greater legiti-
macy on the profession and that enabled them to elevate their status above that
of untrained laymen, clerks, and scriveners. The second phase in Massachusetts
courthouse architecture involved neo-c1assical buildings designed exclusively for
judicial proceedings and land title recording. These courthouses were typically
located in the center of town, near, but no longer above, the central market. In
contrast to the townhouse form, these courthouses included the more modern in-
novations of special tables for lawyers immediately in front of the judges' benches
and the removal of jury deliberations from taverns to sequestering rooms. The
courthouse buildings were attached to jails that, McNamara notes, conveyed the
legal system's ultimate authority over punishment.
The third architectural phase of the Massachusetts courthouse involved campuses
of granite government buildings and jails, further removed from commercial life,
which conveyed the "specialized and disciplinary" nature of the law (72). To McNa-
mara, these groupings of specialized courts reflect the success of lawyers' efforts to
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elevate their status within the legal system by isolating themselves from the bustle
of town life and by excluding non-trained laymen from the competition.
The principal weakness of the book is that McNamara's evidence inadequately
supports her thesis that the desire of the bar to professionalize is the principal causal
explanation for the evolution of courthouse architecture. She provides very little
evidence of lawyers as agents in the architectural transformation she describes. And
why would it not have been the case that judges and other government officials
desired a more dignified atmosphere? Why just lawyers? Moreover, although not
mentioned by McNamara, the period she studies was a time of rapid economic
growth. The architectural improvements are in keeping with changes in architecture
more broadly, and likely reflect greater societal wealth to expend on courthouses and
other buildings. In addition, with respect to the smaller rural towns she describes,
her evidence suggests that architecture evolved because the desire for legal busi-
ness led these towns to constantly upgrade their courthouses as they competed for
status as the location for the official county court. It is not obvious that lawyers
were directly involved in this process. In light of such issues, the repeated return to
unsubstantiated assertions that lawyers' ambitions to professionalize were causally
related to architectural developments weakens the account.
The book, however, will remain as a highly valuable resource for those studying
early American law because the visual images and detailed descriptions of the loca-
tions where justice was administered reveal new features of colonial law. The book
raises the issue of how architecture might have affected other legal developments.
Three possible areas of inquiry are, for example: How was architecture-the move
from tavern to courthouse-related to the decline of the self-informing jury? Is the
decline in the use of shame sanctions related to the isolation of courthouses from
commercial centers? How was architecture affected by Revolutionary politics and
republicanism? From Tavern to Courthouse, particularly the extensive visual im-
ages and anecdotes it provides, is likely to add greater subtlety to legal historians'
accounts in these and in many other areas.
Claire Priest
Northwestern University
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Pp. xii + 655. $35.00 cloth (ISBN 0-19-512903-2); $19.95 paper (ISBN 0-
19-531018-7).
Michael Klarman has written an exhaustive-and according to many reviewers
a definitive-account of the United States Supreme Court's twentieth-century
jurisprudence of race. Klarman describes in varying degrees of detail every Su-
preme Court decision involving race from the beginning of the Plessy era through
Brown v. Board of Education. Klarman organizes the cases into seven historical
periods and accompanies his case discussions with short surveys of each period's
"context." Klarman's method underlies his related theses: that Supreme Court
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decisions are largely reflective of the political and social mores of the times, and
that the decisions did not have great independent significance (5, 448-49, 454).
Klarman is not suggesting that law and politics are one and the same. He contends
that when the law is reasonably clear, judges will generally follow it. Social and
political context come into play only when the law is more indeterminate. But of
course constitutional cases involving race almost always involve some degree of
legal indeterminance. Anyone interested in the role of courts on contested social
and political issues will find much to admire in this book, but may also be troubled
by overdrawn conclusions and sweeping generalizations.
Klarman's Court-as-societal-mirror thesis is neither startling nor original at this
point. It has become a standard revisionist view in political science, history, and
some strands of legal academia. This theory has whittled away at the notion that
Supreme Court justices (and federal judges generally) are anti-democratic and
yet heroic protectors of disempowered groups (449-54). To the contrary, Klar-
man claims that "when a minority group suffering oppression is most in need of
judicial protection, it is least likely to receive it" (450). Instead of creating dra-
matic changes in race relations through ground-breaking decisions, the Supreme
Court embodies changes that have already occurred as a result of a confluence of
"political, economic, social, demographic, ideological, and international causes"
(443). While the Supreme Court race cases of the Jim Crow and Civil Rights
eras appeared contested, Klarman argues that most actually reflected a "national
consensus on a handful of southern outliers" (453).
The book's contribution to the revisionist school then is not in its thesis, but
in its scope and the methodological performance of its thesis. Within its pages,
the reader finds nicely rendered accounts of the Supreme Court's race decisions
surrounded by compelling depictions of the general political milieu during the
Plessy era, the Progressive era, the interwar period, the World War II era, the
post-war lead-up to Brown, Brown itself, and the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s. Sprinkled throughout the historical surveys are individual stories designed
to personalize the general accounts.
The historical surveys are superficial-as surveys necessarily are-and histori-
ans of the periods Klarman describes will undoubtedly find much to criticize. For
example, in describing the Progressive Era, Klarman asserts that the tremendous
popularity of D. W. Griffith's epic film Birth of a Nation "typified the national
racial mood" (66). Most historians would likely agree generally with this statement,
but might fault Klarman for failing to explain also that the film was controversial
enough that some states and cities, including Iowa, Ohio, and St. Louis, Missouri,
forbade it from its theatres, while others demanded modifications to remove the
most inflammatory scenes. Klarman's chapter describing the interwar period ac-
knowledges the NAACP's successful effort to convince some cities to ban the film,
but this discussion does not correct the earlier overgeneralization.
While many readers will find Klarman's historical surveys useful for the sub-
stantive support (and thorough annotations) they provide for his claims, others
will find his broad-brush approach to history frustrating. This use of history is
not problematic merely for purists. Rather, Klarman's willingness to gloss over
